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Summary 
The amendment of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz) has 
prompted the preparation of this paper because of concerns over potential setbacks in 
advances achieved over the past twenty years in regulating German exports to non-EU 
countries and shipments to member states of the EU and the watering down of export 
restrictions to correspond to the low standards in place at the EU level (with the objective 
of streamlining the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and nullifying special German re-
quirements which place German exporters at a disadvantage compared with their Euro-
pean competitors, according to a spokesperson of the German Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology). This would send the wrong signal on combating prolifera-
tion. From the 1970s to 1990s the Federal Republic of Germany played an extremely 
negative role because it opened the doors wide to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction through lax legislation and even more slipshod enforcement. 
Alarmed by several scandals, in recent years the German government has taken the 
lead regarding this issue and it would be appropriate for it to continue to fulfill this role. 
The attitude of the German governments in the 1970s to 1990s as well as the attitude of 
the key government authorities responsible for controlling exports becomes clear through 
the example of the cases of illegal exports of nuclear technology to Pakistan. The cases at 
the beginning of this period show in particular how uninterested key staff members in 
government ministries and authorities were in following up leads from foreign intelli-
gence agencies regarding companies and individuals in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Until the early 1990s the legal situation was such that some acts of proliferation could not 
even be prosecuted because the licensing regime included only goods listed in Part 1 of 
the Export Control List (Ausfuhrliste Teil I). The relevant authorities – the Bundesamt für 
Wirtschaft (Federal Office of Economics, BAW) and customs authorities – were neither 
in terms of personnel nor due to the deficiency of their computer equipment – in a posi-
tion to carry out their legally prescribed duties. The maximum sentence for even the most 
serious proliferation violations was three years in prison.  
These circumstances made it possible that the export of entire production plants for 
the manufacture of uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan by Albrecht Migule (case 1) were 
only investigated after the US applied massive pressure and punished with a sentence of 8 
months – suspended on probation. Other equally significant criminal proceedings ended 
in charges being dropped or in acquittals (case 2: the Heilingbrunner and Lerch trial).  
All the criminal proceedings described above involve the illegal export of nuclear 
technology to Pakistan, mostly in the central area of manufacturing the nuclear fuel ura-
nium-235. The Pakistani scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan plays a prominent role in this 
regard. A. Q. Khan, who completed part of his education as a metallurgist at the Universi-
ty of Technology in what was at the time West Berlin and was already able at that time to 
establish contacts with German citizens, acquired the necessary knowledge about the 
technology of uranium enrichment using gas ultracentrifuges during his work at the be-
ginning of the 1970s for the trilateral organization URENCO at the Dutch uranium en-
richment plant in Almelo. At the same time he acquired information about the various 
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German suppliers for Almelo. After his return to Pakistan in 1975, he carried out urani-
um enrichment with the support of the then premier, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. When doing 
this he made use of the knowledge about uranium enrichment he had acquired in Almelo 
and the personal contacts he had established in Europe with suppliers of nuclear technol-
ogy, from whom he obtained relevant exports. In this way, Khan made a decisive contri-
bution to Pakistan’s successful detonation of nuclear explosives in 1998, and Pakistan was 
thus the first Islamic state to possess the atomic bomb. 
In the early 1990s, various scandals (among others events involving the Hanau firm 
Transnuklear, which led to criminal proceedings against Ortmayer and others – case 3 – 
as well as events involving the construction of a poison gas factory by the German “gen-
eral contractor” Dr. Jürgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen in Rabta, Libya) led to a change in 
German export policy. There were decisive improvements to the authorization regula-
tions and criminal law, appropriate financing and staffing of the authorization and cus-
toms agencies and intensive exchanges of information among the relevant authorities and 
their agencies. This had a positive impact on various criminal proceedings. Persons about 
whom there had been suspicions for decades that they could be playing a leading role in 
illegal exports to Pakistan, such as Heinz Mebus and his son-in-law Ernst Piffl (cases 4 
and 5), could now be prosecuted. The change could be clearly seen in the criminal pro-
ceedings against the head of the firm V. just described, which could be opened not on the 
basis of foreign information but of a local investigation, and which ended in November 
2005 with a prison sentence of seven years and three months and the cancellation of fi-
nancial compensation in the amount of €150,000. What a difference from the criminal 
proceedings against Albrecht Migule! 
The approach adopted at the beginning of the 1990s should continue to be pursued. 
Instead of making things easier for arms exports through the revision of the Foreign 
Trade and Payments Act, the German government ought to adopt measures to improve 
export controls at the national level even further.  
This includes, for instance, post-shipment controls, in other words checking whether 
goods have reached the country to which they were being exported or whether those 
goods are still there. Such a check would be an effective means for detecting indirect de-
liveries and if necessary taking action. The personnel for this would already be available in 
part. The Federal Customs Administration makes use of customs liaison officers/customs 
attachés in numerous countries and these could take over this task. Included among these 
countries are the United Arab Emirates, a commonly used conduit for exporting goods to 
the final destination of Iran or Pakistan. 
The number of foreign trade and payments audits would have to be drastically in-
creased. In 1989 approximately 450 foreign trade and payment audits were carried out; 
the number increased during the 1990s to a maximum of 1,500 audits and then sank again 
to the present estimated 1,000 audits per year although there are tens of thousands of 
companies involved in foreign trade and payments. 
For effective export controls in the future measures at the level of the EU are of critical 
importance. Here the German government should exert its influence in order to see to it 
that cooperation among customs administrations in the area of export controls is deci-
sively improved. The intensive cooperation that is common practice in for example 
narcotrafficking, contraband cigarette smuggling or brand piracy must be possible in the 
case of export controls too. In my opinion, the breakthrough to effective European export 
controls would be achieved through the creation of a European Anti-Proliferation Office – 
similar to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), which has already existed for years – 
which would collate the data on proliferation activities (companies and individuals) already 
available in the various European countries, process them and use them in investigations.  
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1.  Introduction 
“German government intends to streamline weapons exports – weapons and tanks manu-
factured in Germany are high in demand. But until now such exports were subject to 
strict conditions. According to information obtained by SPIEGEL, that could now 
change.” The current amendment of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act1 being carried 
out was commented upon by SPIEGEL-online in this way on July 15, 2012. However, a 
spokeswoman for the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, which is responsi-
ble for the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, immediately explained to the news agency 
dapd that the amendment “specifically did not involve” the export of armaments. The 
goal was “to streamline the Foreign Trade and Payments Act” and “to repeal German 
special provisions which placed German exporters at a disadvantage with regard to their 
European competitors.” The amendment allegedly only involves the shipment of arma-
ments to other member states of the EU and will make this easier.2 Whether this is really 
the case requires close examination.3 Even the easing of restrictions on shipping of arma-
ments is not without problems if it makes subsequent export easier.  
The Federal Republic of Germany in particular should take care not to deviate from 
the course of tightening of export controls introduced at the beginning of the 1990s – 
after the Rabta scandal4 – to instead revert to the status of a country in which export 
scandals were a regular occurrence.  
This report covers that period and the period following it and, taking the example of 
Pakistan, shows how this country succeeded in becoming a nuclear power through illegal 
exports from Germany. Of particular importance in this is the Pakistani scientist Dr. Ab-
dul Qadeer Khan, who on account of his work on the advanced enrichment of uranium is 
frequently referred to as the “father of the Pakistani atom bomb.”5 Germany's contribu-
tion primarily consists of the numerous unauthorized exports to Pakistan partly of com-
plete plants, partly of individual components for the production of enriched uranium, the 
procurement of which can be largely attributed to Abdul Qadeer Khan’s knowledge of 
nuclear technology companies in the Federal Republic of Germany, knowledge which 
 
 
1  Draft legislation to modernize the Foreign Trade and Payments Act – BR-Drs. 519/12 of August 31, 2012. 
2  “export” – shipment of goods to a third country (a country outside the EU); “shipment” – delivery of 
goods to a member state of the EU.  
3  For example, § 5c AWV is to be struck from the legislation. However, § 5c also addressed the export of 
armaments. Nonetheless, this removal would have no consequences, since Art. 4 of the EU dual-use regu-
lation covers such cases. 
4   In Rabta, Libya the German industrialist Dr. Jürgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, acting as “general contractor,” 
built a factory for the production of poison gas.  
5   From time to time there has been dispute about this title for A. Q. Khan: a study by the IISS, 2007, p. 15. 
Regarding the political decision, this title is said to be deserved far more by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and by the 
Chairman of PAEC for many years, Munir Ahmad Khan, as far as the technical implementation of the de-
cision is concerned. 
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Khan acquired during his time in the Netherlands. What must be taken into account is 
that the legal situation in the 1970s and 80s was favorable for such exports and because of 
their inadequate staffing and equipment and poor networking the government agencies 
were not in a position to detect such exports early enough and prevent them or even pros-
ecute them. Since the 1990s, however, as a result of the changed legal situation and the 
improved capacities of the German agencies, to an increasing extent it has been possible 
to detect and block Pakistani procurement; where there had already been successful ex-
ports the German customs investigation service in particular successfully carried out 
criminal investigations which in many cases resulted in criminal convictions. These ver-
dicts provide an important basis for the following section. 
The example of Pakistan shows that through new investigative instruments and inten-
sive cooperation at the national level it is possible to move from cases of initial failure to 
impressive success. Nonetheless, there are grounds for concern today about resting on 
one’s laurels and underestimating the danger that is still posed by the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction. The number of cases detected is small and the media too, which once 
displayed strong interest in the topic of proliferation, hardly give this topic attention any 
more, let alone – as happened very often in the past – themselves exposing cases through 
investigative journalism. A new surge in interest is needed which should not just happen 
in response to a new scandal. It is no longer enough to be well prepared at the national 
level alone. The EU needs to take up this topic intensively by establishing an agency which 
collates and evaluates the knowledge already available – in part for a long time already – 
in the various member states, and uses this knowledge as the basis for taking specific 
measures against the wider spread of proliferation. The European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF – Office européen de lutte antifraude) could be the model for a future “Anti-
Proliferation Office”.  
2.  The Technology of Uranium Enrichment and Pakistan’s Acqui-
sition of this Knowledge 
After the initial deployment of atom bombs by the US in the Second World War other 
states sought – and are still seeking – to become nuclear powers too in order to either 
achieve a position of dominance in their region or to be able to stand up to an all-
powerful neighboring state. India and Pakistan are among this group of countries. 
2.1 The technology of uranium enrichment with gas ultracentrifuges 
Two prerequisites are decisive for the manufacture of nuclear weapons: weapons-grade 
fissile material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium-235) and detonator technology. In 
the case of weapons-grade fissile material Pakistan has taken both paths. German exports 
mainly consisted of technology for production of highly-enriched uranium and from 
among the various manufacturing technologies, the technology for uranium enrichment 
using gas ultracentrifuges.  
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Enrichment of uranium-235 by means of gas ultracentrifuges is one of a number of pos-
sibilities for enriching uranium-235. Uranium-235 can also be enriched using the jet nozzle 
process, the gas diffusion process, electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) or laser en-
richment;6 today, enrichment with gas ultracentrifuges is the most economical method. 
Since the 1970s the gas ultracentrifuge process has been used industrially in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain by the URENCO consortium. 
The basic principles of the gas ultracentrifuge process are well known and not classi-
fied; only its details are. 
Uranium-235 is required for operating nuclear power stations and the production of 
nuclear warheads. The uranium-235 isotope – fissile through slow neutrons – only com-
prises about 0.7% of natural uranium; approximately 99.3% of natural uranium consists 
of the isotope uranium-238. To be used as fuel in nuclear power plants the proportion of 
isotope 235 must be enriched from 0.7% to 2.5 to 5% (low enriched uranium – LEU). At 
an enrichment level of 20% U-235 we speak of highly enriched uranium (HEU) which can 
be used for weapons production.  
The purpose of all enrichment processes is the separation of uranium-235 from the 
heavy uranium-238 and the enrichment of the uranium-235. 
Before the uranium-235 can be enriched to the desired level the following steps must 
be carried out: 
• Mining of uranium ore. The key uranium mining countries are Australia, Canada and 
Niger. Pakistan also has uranium deposits. 
• Extraction of the uranium from the ore.  
• Chemical conversion of the uranium that has been extracted into uranium hexafluo-
ride (UF6) in so-called conversion plants. 
• Transport of the uranium hexafluoride in standardized transport containers from the 
so-called conversion plants to the uranium enrichment plant.  
At the uranium enrichment plants the actual process of uranium enrichment then takes 
place. At room temperature uranium hexafluoride is a white solid substance which only 
takes on the required gaseous state at a higher temperature. The transport container with 
the solid uranium hexafluoride is heated in a heating chamber – an autoclave. Under the-
se conditions the uranium hexafluoride becomes gaseous, allowing it to be fed into the gas 
ultracentrifuges. Upon being fed into the rotor of the gas ultracentrifuge the uranium 
hexafluoride is swept along with the rotor which spins at extremely high speed. The heavy 
uranium-238 is separated from the lighter uranium-235 by the centrifugal force. At the 
upper end the uranium-238 depleted of uranium-235 is extracted through small station-
ary tubes called scoops – which end in a hook-shaped Pitot tube – while the uranium 
 
 
6   Schaper/Frank 1998, Appendix B: A comparison of enrichment procedures. 
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hexafluoride enriched with uranium-235 is removed by scoops at the lower end of the 
centrifuge.  
The degree of enrichment achieved with one gas ultracentrifuge is not sufficient to 
achieve the desired concentration of approximately 3% uranium-235. To achieve this, 
centrifuges – in practice 10,000 and more – must be linked in parallel and in series. The 
sequence of gas ultracentrifuges connected in parallel and series is called a cascade. Sever-
al cascades are operated alongside each other in a so-called separator building. 
After the separation process in the cascades of gas ultracentrifuges the uranium-235 
enriched and uranium-235 depleted streams are collected separately in deep frozen con-
tainers – so-called sublimators – and later conveyed to transport containers.  
After this, transport to fuel element fabrication plants takes place. There, the uranium, 
now enriched to 3–5%, is converted into pellets. Fuel rods are filled with these pellets and 
are then used in nuclear power plants. 
Highly enriched uranium-235, which is required for building nuclear weapons, is ob-
tained by continuing the separation process longer.  
2.2 The acquisition of the technology – further development 
2.2.1 Abdul Qadeer Khan – origins and career up to 1975 
A. Q. Khan was the central figure in Pakistan’s efforts to become a nuclear power. Khan 
was born in 1936 in Bhopal in what was at that time British India. After the partition of 
British India into Pakistan and India in 1947 he emigrated to Pakistan in 1952. Khan 
studied mechanical engineering at the University of Karachi. After completing his studies 
he was initially an inspector at a bureau of standards. In 1961 he gave up this occupation 
and left Pakistan for further studies in Europe. Initially he studied at the Technical Uni-
versity in the then West Berlin and in 1963 went to Delft (Netherlands), where he studied 
metallurgy at the Technical University and in 1967 he received the masters degree of MSc 
(Physical Metallurgy) (Langewiesche 2005: 3ff). After four years in Delft he moved with 
his family to Leuven (Belgium). In 1972 he received his PhD (Physical Metallurgy) from 
the university in Leuven, Belgium for a study of the elasticity of metal alloys.7 From May 
1972 he worked for the Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratorium Technische 
Onderzoeken B.V. (FDO) in Amsterdam (Albright 2010: 15), itself part of Werkspoor Am-
sterdam, a partner of Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland N.V. (UCN) in Almelo, which in turn 
was the Dutch partner of the trilateral consortium URENCO Limited in Marlow near Lon-
don (GB) (Sublette 2002: 1).  
 
 
7   Interview with A. Q. Khan in the Pakistani Defence Journal, No. 12, 1990: 8ff; Langewiesche 2005: 5. 
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Khan required a security clearance for his work for FDO because, according to the 
Treaty of Almelo,8 the technical details of the manufacture and operation of gas ultracen-
trifuges were officially classified. The documents and objects were classified with varying 
degrees of confidentiality.9 On May 19, 1972 Khan signed a confidentiality agreement 
with FDO which among other things informed him about his duty of secrecy in connec-
tion with the gas ultracentrifuge project and drew attention to the consequences of a vio-
lation – even after leaving the company.10 From the Dutch Ministry of Economics Khan 
received only authorization to deal with documents having a low level of classification 
involving the Dutch centrifuges only, not documents of the British and German partners 
to the treaty (Albright 2010: 18). 
Within a short time of starting work with FDO, Khan had already visited the enrich-
ment plant in Almelo. Khan was entrusted with the task of translating top secret technical 
documents which described the centrifuges in detail. He was often able to take these doc-
uments home with him (Albright 2010: 23). In his first two years of employment Khan 
worked with two older types of Dutch centrifuge – the CNOR and the SNOR; at the end 
of 1974 Khan translated highly classified documents concerned with the two more ad-
vanced German type G-1 and G-2 centrifuges (Sublette 2002: 2; Koppe/Koch 1990: 35f; 
Der Spiegel 1979: 46:202ff; Albright 2010: 18f; IISS Strategic Dossier 2007: 17).  
2.2.2 Khan’s return to Pakistan in December 1975 
In December 1975 A. Q. Khan flew to Pakistan with his family – ostensibly to have a vaca-
tion – and has not returned. He advised his employer, FDO, that he was sick; later he 
declared that he had found new employment so that regrettably he had to resign 
(Langewiesche 2005: 10f). His return is said to have been preceded by a letter on Septem-
ber 1974 from Khan to the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, in which Khan is supposed to 
have offered his services (Sublette 2002: 2). Bhutto is said to have answered via the Paki-
stan Embassy in The Hague, and the two are supposed to have met in Karachi in Decem-
ber 1974 – during a vacation. A. Q. Khan is said to have convinced Bhutto not to rely only 
on plutonium for building an atomic bomb (see below), but to take the faster route by 
means of the high-level enrichment of uranium, especially since at that time Pakistan – on 
May 18, 1974 India had conducted its first nuclear test – had learned that Canada had 
ceased its support for the first Pakistani nuclear power plant KANUPP I (Karachi Nuclear 
Power Plant), built in the vicinity of Karachi, and that because of US protests France was 
no longer willing to complete the contractually agreed upon and partially completed con-
struction of a reprocessing plant whose operation would yield plutonium (Koppe/Koch 
 
 
8   Treaty of March 4, 1970 between the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on cooperation in the development and use of 
the gas ultracentrifuges process for the production of enriched uranium – BGBl. 1971, part II: 930ff. 
9   Treaty, Appendix II – Security procedure and confidentiality –BGBl. II, 930ff (946ff).  
10   Verdict on appeal of the State Court of Amsterdam of November 14, 1983. 
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1990: 43). Bhutto is supposed to have regarded it as advantageous to pursue the path of 
both plutonium production and a high-enrichment program for uranium, and is said to 
have given A. Q. Khan the task of enriching uranium (Langewiesche 2005: 8). Khan re-
turned to Amsterdam and at the latest from that point in time he may well have smuggled 
out the uranium enrichment process designs from Almelo. 
2.2.3 Pakistan’s development of nuclear technology until 1975 
Pakistan’s nuclear armaments program was already in full swing at the time of Khan’s 
return in December 1975. This progression to the status of a nuclear power had begun in 
the mid-1950s when Pakistan signed a treaty with the US on the peaceful use of nuclear 
power in 1953. On December 8, 1953 then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower made a 
speech in the UN General Assembly – “Atoms for Peace” – in which he called upon the 
member states to make peaceful use of atomic energy and at the same time suggested the 
formation of an international Agency for Atomic Energy – what later became the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – which should on the one hand promote the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy and on the other hand should ensure that nuclear energy 
could not be used for military purposes. 
In March 1956 the Pakistani Prime Minister Huseyn Suhravadrie founded the Pakistan 
Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) with the title “Atomic Energy Research Council” in 
Islamabad.11  
In 1960 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was serving as Minister of Mineral and Natural Resources 
in Ayub Khan’s cabinet, and Dr. Ishrat H Usmani was director of the PAEC. One of 
Usmani’s most important decisions was to send overseas for training approximately 600 
Pakistanis, of whom ultimately about 100 returned to Pakistan with a doctoral degree 
(Sublette 2002: 3). 3). The Federal Republic of Germany also contributed to a considerable 
degree to the training of Pakistani scientists in the nuclear research centers in Karlsruhe 
and Jülich:12 Here especially Dr. Nyamat Ali Javed must be mentioned. He was at the Nu-
clear Research Center Karlsruhe (KfK) for training in 1974 and in later years became fuel 
 
 
11   www.paec.gov.pk/paec-hist.htm. 
12   The cooperation between Pakistan and the Federal Republic of Germany is based on the “Treaty between 
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pa-
kistan concerning cooperation in scientific research and technical development”, which was signed on 
November 30, 1972 in Islamabad and came into effect on October 15, 1973 – BGBl. 1974 II, 68ff. In the 
area of nuclear technology cooperation was spelled out in more detail: “An agreement on cooperation in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy was entered into on June 25, 1974 between the Gesellschaft für 
Kernforschung mbH (GfK) – which later became the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KfK) – and the 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) [...]. According to this, cooperation was to cover the entire 
spectrum of peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the policy areas of uranium enrichment, repro-
cessing, and heavy-water production which are sensitive in terms of nonproliferation.” – BT-Drs. 
11/7800 – Decision recommendation and report of the second investigative committee – 235 left column 
(printed boldface by the author); see also BT-Drs. 11/644 of July 27, 1987: 3f and BT-Drs. 11/7800: 236 left 
column; Koppe/Koch 1990: 37ff report many visits by German nuclear physicists in Pakistan.  
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cycle director at the PAEC (Koppe/Koch 1990: 111). Dr. Javed was – together with 
Sulfikar Ahmed Butt – one of the two persons with whom Rudolf Ortmayer of the NTG 
company established contacts (see below). 
Also in 1960 the US provided Pakistan with $350,000 in development aid for the con-
struction of its first research reactor – a 5MW light water reactor operated with highly 
enriched uranium known as PARR-1 (Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor) – which com-
menced operations in 1965 in the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Sciences and Technology 
(PINSTECH) in Nilore.13  
In 1960 President Ayub Khan named as his advisor for scientific matters Dr. Abdus 
Salam, who represented Pakistan as the leader of its delegation to the IAEA. In 1965 Dr. 
Salam travelled to the US where Pakistan and Canada signed a contract with General 
Electric Canada for the construction of the first nuclear power station in Karachi (Karachi 
Nuclear Power Plant – KANUPP I14). Construction commenced in 1966 and was com-
pleted in 1971.15  
After the Third India-Pakistan War/the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, which 
ended with a devastating defeat for Pakistan, Bhutto, winner of the election in (West) 
Pakistan, became Prime Minister and was thus able to realize his long cherished plans to 
arm Pakistan with nuclear weapons.  
January 24, 1972 is regarded as the birth date for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. 
Bhutto is said to have had a strictly confidential meeting with about 70 leading scientists 
in Multan on that day. Bhutto demanded that they develop nuclear weapons, placed the 
PAEC directly under the authority of his office and named Munir Ahmad Khan, who had 
worked as head of the IAEA Reactor Engineering Division in Vienna, as head of the 
PAEC (Corera 2006: 9f).  
Decisive for a nuclear weapons program is the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile 
material. Plutonium or highly enriched uranium-235 comes into question as weapons-
grade fissile material. Pakistan initially chose to produce plutonium for its nuclear weap-
ons. For with the heavy water reactor KANUPP I Pakistan was in a position to produce its 
own heavy water. However, Pakistan needed a reprocessing plant to recover plutonium 
from spent fuel rods. As a result, at the beginning of the 1970s a research reprocessing 
plant with the name “New Labs” was constructed in the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear 
Sciences and Technology by the Belgonucleaire company and the French firm Saint-
Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN). In March 1973 a contract was signed with SGN for 
the construction of a large-scale reprocessing plant with a capacity of more than 100 tons 
of fuel per year. The CHASMA plant would have had a capacity of 200 kg of weapons-
 
 
13   BT-Drs. 11/7800: 237 right column. 
14   Power reactor from the heavy-water/natural uranium line of the Canadian CANDU type – BT-Drs. 
11/7800: 237 right column. 
15   BT-Drs. 11/7800: 237. 
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grade plutonium per year (Weissman/Krosney 1981: 66). However, the realization of the 
CHASMA project was blocked by US protests. In June 1978 France officially declared that 
the contract with Pakistan for the construction of the reprocessing plant had been can-
celled.16 
2.2.4 Development and construction of the uranium enrichment plant in Kahuta 
When A. Q. Khan returned to Pakistan permanently in December 1975 he initially 
worked for the PAEC. A small pilot plant for uranium enrichment with gas ultracentri-
fuges headed by Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood had been set up in Sihala – a few kilome-
ters southeast of Islamabad. Khan initially worked under Mahmood as his director of 
research and development (Corera 2006: 17). But there were soon quarrels between him 
and the head of the PAEC, Munir Ahmad Khan. A. Q. Khan complained to Bhutto about 
Munir Ahmad Khan and the limited progress being made by the PAEC. Bhutto took no 
action against Munir Ahmad Khan, but he decided that A. Q. Khan would work inde-
pendently of the PAEC and report directly to him and also guaranteed him a substantial 
budget (Langewiesche 2005: 14f). On July 31, 1976 A. Q. Khan founded the Engineering 
Research Laboratories (ERL) in the immediate vicinity of Kahuta, and built a uranium 
centrifuge plant based on the URENCO plants (Khan 1990: 18). Due to the clandestine 
procurements then taking place in Europe, the project made rapid progress. The export 
controls which were completely inadequate both in legal terms and also in practice (see 
below) in the 1970s and 1980s made procuring the required components easy for A. Q. 
Khan.  
According to Khan, uranium was enriched for the first time on April 4, 1978. The 
plant was completed in 1979 and as of 1981 was producing enriched uranium in quanti-
ties worth mentioning. In recognition of Khan’s services the then President, Zia Ul Haq, 
renamed the plant Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in the same year (Sublette 2002: 3). 
3.  Export of Goods for Uranium Enrichment from Germany 
As a consequence of the knowledge he had acquired at Urenco Nederland about the sup-
pliers of components for the uranium enrichment in Almelo, and especially its core ele-
ment – the gas ultracentrifuge – A. Q. Khan was able to approach the companies 
specifically. In doing this he made use of the friends in the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Great Britain and Germany whom he made during his time as a student in Germany and 
the Netherlands and during his other stays in Europe: Henk Slebos, Friedrich Tinner, 
Peter Griffin, Günes Cirek and Heinz Mebus. Since procuring of materials from Germany 
is the central issue here, reference will be made only in passing to Henk Slebos and the 
 
 
16   See Weissman/Krosney 1981 about further details: 206-208. SGN allegedly tried to continue to conduct 
the business via the Italian company Alcom. 
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other persons mentioned. The presentation of events is based on above all verdicts in 
German criminal courts from 1985 to 2008.  
Two things should be kept in mind in evaluating the cases presented.  
The legal and factual situation has changed in the course of these years, partly substan-
tially for the better. Initially, the authorization legislation had substantial gaps, which could 
only be filled gradually. Because of their completely inadequate provision with personnel 
and equipment and poor exchange of information, the German government agencies re-
sponsible for export controls were completely unable to carry out their duties effectively. In 
addition, the political will to act decisively against proliferation was lacking. Events sur-
rounding the construction of a poison gas factory in Rabta, Libya, led to a change in Ger-
man export control policy and practice. The law on authorization was decisively improved 
initially at national level through the so-called catch all clauses of §§ 5aff AWV, later 
through the EU dual use regulation, and penalties were repeatedly made more severe. Ex-
port control agencies were substantially better equipped with staff and resources and the 
flow of information among departments and the agencies belonging to them optimized.17 
The sentences of Migule and Dr. Heiligbrunner/Lerch are examples of the situation of 
export controls before the change in German export control; the other sentences are ex-
amples of the situation afterwards. 
The sentences only involve a fraction of the procurement transactions which actually 
took place for they had to leave out of account actions that had exceeded the statute of limi-
tations and could only punish actions which could be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
In following sections not all prosecutions involving the provision of nuclear arma-
ments to Pakistan by German companies will be presented; a selection shows equally well 
on the one hand the extent to which German companies participated in the nuclear arm-
ing of Pakistan, and on the other, however, also how – distributed over the years – the 
legal and actual situation as well as the attitude of German agencies changed for the better 
from the point of view of fighting proliferation.  
3.1 Criminal proceedings against Albrecht Migule18 
At the very beginning comes the – in my opinion – most significant case of unauthorized 
export of goods to Pakistan: the delivery of a complete factory for the production of ura-
nium hexafluoride (UF6), which is (highly) enriched with uranium-235 during the en-
richment process. The presentation of the case is based for the most part on the findings 
in the verdict of the Freiburg Municipal Court on March 11, 1985. 
 
 
17   The situation before and after Rabta, Libya is described in detail by Müller 1989 and Müller/ 
Dembinski/Kelle/Schaper 1994. 
18   Verdict of the Freiburg Municipal Court on May 11, 1985 – 41 Ls 103/82. 
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In 1976 and 1977 the Freiburg businessman Albrecht Migule, in his capacity as man-
aging director of the firm CES (Chemical Engineering Services) Kalthof GmbH, signed 
with the firm Arshad, Amjad and Arbid Ltd., Karachi, Pakistan – referred to as Triple A – 
three contracts for the delivery of the following plants: 
On November 13, 1976 a contract for the delivery of a production plant for the manu-
facture of hydrofluoric acid (HF) and fluorine gas (F2) was signed, in which the scope of 
performance of the supplier agreed upon in the contract encompassed the complete plan-
ning and related engineering work all the way through to commencement of production. 
The total purchase price amounted to DM 5,445,625.  
On January 3, 1977 a contract for the delivery of a uranium hexafluoride (UF6) plant 
with a capacity of 198 t per year and a uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) plant with a capacity of 
177 t per year, for which a price of in total DM 3,753,554 was agreed upon. 
On May 9, 1977 the delivery of a uranium dioxide (UO2) plant with a capacity of 16 t 
per year at a price of DM 5,900,000 was signed. 
These plants taken together form a production unit for the manufacture of uranium 
hexafluoride, the only application of which is the production of enriched uranium, i.e. 
fissile material.  
“One of Migule’s negotiating partners was Dr. Nyamat Ali Javed, who in 1974, togeth-
er with Abdul Majid had been trained in hot cell technology at the KfK in Karlsruhe and 
in the meantime had progressed to the position of director of the PAEC. Also involved in 
closing the contract were Mr Farooq and Mr Yousi of AAA.,” according to Koppe/Koch 
in their description of the case (Koppe/Koch 1990: 61; see also Barth 1981: 28, 96-99).  
The verdict of the Freiburg Municipal Court does not contain any details of how these 
contracts came into existence; it also does not mention the name of A. Q. Khan. The con-
tact was probably made through the engineer Heinz Mebus, a friend of Khan’s from their 
student days at the TU in Berlin. On April 23, 1977 CES Kalthof signed a contract with 
Mebus which involved his taking part in the projects; later additions extended his duties 
to include heading up the project (Koch 1988: 229; Koppe/Koch 1990: 57ff; Barth 1981, 
28: 96-99). Migule had met Mebus at the Gattys company in Neu Isenburg before the two 
set up on their own (Koppe/Koch 1990: 61).  
On Migule’s instructions, the machines, materials and various pieces of equipment re-
quired to construct the plant were delivered between May 1977 and April 1980 in 62 
shipments from the Federal Republic of Germany to Pakistan, where the plant was con-
structed under the supervision of the CES Kalthof company at an immediately neighbor-
ing complex. Migule and Mebus as well as engineers of CES Kalthof were repeatedly 
present in Pakistan (Koppe/Koch 1990: 58-62). The deliveries were declared as “machines 
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and equipment for a chemical factory”.19 The customs office responsible cleared the goods 
without any objections because their true significance was not recognized. The customs 
administration even placed a storage shed at Migule’s disposal so that the company did 
not have to store the goods in Welchental.  
Export licenses were not applied for at the appropriate licensing authority – the then 
Federal Office for Commercial Economics (BAW) – even though the requirement for a 
license was known to Migule. 
On March 13, 1985 Albrecht Migule was sentenced by the Freiburg Municipal Court to 
eight months imprisonment for violations of § 34 (1) 3 of the Foreign Trade and Payments 
Act – suspended on probation – an extremely mild punishment in view of the significance 
of his offense. However, at that time the maximum legal penalty was only three years in 
prison. Today the maximum punishment in normal cases is five years and – in especially 
serious cases – fifteen years imprisonment. As a surety for his probation he had to pay the 
sum of DM 30,000. Heinz Mebus – for some inexplicable reason – got off scot free. 
The export of the plant for producing uranium hexafluoride meant that the conditions 
for highly enriching uranium 235 in a uranium enrichment plant had been achieved, one 
of the most important prerequisites for building atom bombs.  
How did it come to the criminal proceedings against Albrecht Migule? Not only the 
lenient punishment but also the events leading up to the criminal proceedings are typical 
for the way the Federal Government/German governments handled proliferation offences 
at that time:  
In spring 1979 in the vicinity of a uranium ore mining operation in the Dera Ghazi 
Khan region the CIA came across representatives of two German companies who were 
working in plants for processing the uranium ore. The US government informed the West 
German Government about what they had discovered, but did not disclose any company 
names (Koppe/Koch 1990: 57, 59). This took place through a so-called non-paper of the 
US government on June 16, 1980. 
The British government also sent the West German government a non-paper with the 
same contents on July 14, 1980 and called on the West German Government to investi-
gate immediately (Koppe/Koch 1990: 59). Despite the detailed information in both com-
munications from the US and Great Britain, the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology, saw no reason to examine the matter closely, for “a check by the firm Kalthof 
which has been named has been determined by the BAW not to be known to the office, 
neither through lodging export license applications nor through any correspondence.”20 
 
 
19   Kleine-Brockhoff, in; Die Zeit of June 1, 1984; Kleine-Brockhoff, in: Die Zeit of March 15, 1985; Kleine-
Brockhoff, in:  Stuttgarter Zeitung of December28, 1988. 
20   According to the written comment of the official in charge in the Office for Foreign Trade and Payments 
of the BMWi reproduced by Koppe/Koch 1990 on p. 59. 
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As though there would not have been sufficient possibilities for identifying the two com-
panies unequivocally and without any great effort. Not until October 1980, after the British 
had provided additional information about the two companies did the BMWi, through its 
agency, the BAW, rouse itself to call for an audit of foreign trade and payments of CES 
Kalthof by the Freiburg Regional Tax Office. The results became available in February 1981. 
The Regional Tax Office initially initiated proceedings for a fine against Albrecht Migule, as 
they did not attach any great importance to the matter (Koppe/Koch 1990: 60, 63). Only 
after the press reported on the matter in summer 1981 (Stern 1981, 28: 96-98), did the Frei-
burg Regional Tax Office brief the Freiburg District Attorney’s Office, which then com-
menced a criminal investigation through the then Freiburg Customs Investigation Office.21 
3.2 Criminal proceedings against Dr. Otto Heilingbrunner and Gotthard Lerch  
The procurement of in particular autoclaves and desublimators for uranium enrichment 
plants by Dr. Heilingbrunner and Gotthard Lerch has been described in detail by 
Koppe/Koch (1990: 72-105). That is why only a brief summary of events will be given here.  
Dr. Heilingbrunner and Lerch were managers in the firm Leybold-Heraeus. The 
Leybold-Heraeus company – known today as Leybold AG – was and still is a leader in the 
manufacture of pumps. Special pumps are required in uranium enrichment plants. 
Leybold-Heraeus supplied the pumps for the uranium enrichment plant in Almelo, and 
Lerch was in charge of supplying them. He made the acquaintance of A. Q. Khan in this 
capacity.  
Working for the Pakistanis, Dr. Heilingbrunner and Lerch approached the Buchs met-
al fabrication plant in Switzerland. According to URENCO documents, they had among 
other things autoclaves and desublimators built there and exported these to Pakistan via 
France. Uranium hexafluoride, which is a solid at room temperature, is heated in auto-
claves so that it becomes gaseous and can be fed into gas ultracentrifuges; desublimators 
are containers at both ends of the gas ultracentrifuge cascades in which the uranium-235 
enriched and depleted uranium hexafluoride are collected and cooled. When this became 
known to the German authorities, the departments responsible decided in September 
1986 to open criminal proceedings for violation of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act 
and to request help from the Swiss government agencies. However, several more months 
passed before it was decided in a further departmental meeting in April 1987 that “the 
BMF […] will formally direct the Customs Criminal Service to obtain through the Co-
logne District Attorney’s Office a search and seizure warrant against Leybold Heraeus 
from the responsible judge, at the latest on April 21, 1987 (Koppe/Koch 1990: 101). This 
decision was preceded by a conversation between the journalist Egmont R. Koch and the 
 
 
21   Information given by the district attorney responsible at that time during a phone conversation with the 
author on October 26, 2011. 
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Customs Investigations Office in Cologne at the beginning of February 1987 in which 
Koch had informed the customs investigators about what he knew. In addition, the repre-
sentatives of the responsible departments knew that a report by Koch was to be expected 
in Stern magazine on April 28, 1987 (“Stern” 1981, 28: 96-99). On April 27, 1987, under 
the leadership of the Cologne District Attorney, Leybold-Heraeus in Cologne and Hanau 
as well as the private apartment of Dr. Heilingbrunner were searched (Koch 1988: 250f). 
Dr. Heilingbrunner and Lerch were prosecuted by the Cologne District Attorney for vio-
lations of the Act against Unfair Competition (UWG). An indictment on a charge of vio-
lations of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act was not possible because Switzerland 
refused to provide judicial assistance. The Cologne District Court acquitted both defend-
ants on April 30, 1992, because it could not be proved with the required degree of certain-
ty that they had transported to Switzerland documents for the manufacture of parts for 
uranium enrichment plants without authorization and to their own advantage.22  
The Swiss nationals had already been sentenced to fines of 4,000 Swiss francs by the 
Werdenberg District Court (Bezirksgericht) in the summer of 1987.23 
Almost twenty years after the first trial before the Cologne Municipal Court, Lerch was 
once again on trial before a German court; the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court sentenced 
him to five years in prison.24 However, this second trial had nothing to do with the issue of 
how Pakistan succeeded in becoming a nuclear power, but instead involved the prolifera-
tion network of A. Q. Khan, of which Gotthard Lerch was a part.  
3.3 Criminal proceedings against Rudolf Ortmayer and others 
The criminal proceedings against Rudolf Ortmayer, Peter Finke and Dr. Heinrich 
Weichselgartner, of Neue Technologien GmbH & Co KG (NTG) in Gelnhausen for unau-
thorized export of plants and materials for the manufacture of fuel rods to Pakistan and 
offences against the War Weapons Control Act were conducted by the Hanau District 
Attorney in connection with events surrounding the Hanau nuclear company NUKEM 
GmbH, Reaktor Brennelemente GmbH, Hochtemperaturreaktor-Brennelement GmbH, 
ALKEM GmbH, Transnuklear GmbH and Nukleare Transportleistungen GmbH, which 
aroused public interest in 1987 when suspicion of irregularities in connection with the 
disposal of radioactive waste became known. It involved in particular the disposal of 
waste in Mol, Belgium. In addition, there were suspicions of the misappropriation of fis-
sile material and the unauthorized export of this material to Libya or Pakistan.25 This led 
 
 
22   Verdict of the Cologne Municipal Court on April 30, 1992 – 583 Ls 121/91; Albright 2010: 67f. 
23  Koppe/Koch1990: 103; decision and report of the 2nd inquiry commission in accordance with Art. 44 of 
the Constitution (Grundgesetz) – BT-Drs. 11/7800 of October 15, 1990: 265. 
24   Verdict of the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court of October 16, 2008 - 4 – 3 StE 1/07. 
25   Recommendation and report of the 2nd Commission of Inquiry, according to Article 44 of the German 
Constitution – BT-Drs. 11/7800 of October 15, 1990: 12; Remarks on pages 1087ff – The suspicion of pro-
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to all parties represented in the Federal Parliament demanding the setting up of a com-
mission of inquiry, and moving the appropriate motions in January 1988.26 The commis-
sion began its work on January 22, 1988.27 Not until significantly later – in January 1989 – 
was the commission’s remit expanded so that it now also encompassed criminal investiga-
tions by several district attorneys of violations of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act 
(AWG) and the War Weapons Control Act (KWKG) through unauthorized exports as 
well as the criminal proceedings of the Hanau District Attorney against Rudolf Ortmayer, 
Peter Finke and Dr. Heinrich Weichselgartner.28 
The criminal proceedings against Rudolf Ortmayer, Peter Finke and Dr. Heinrich 
Weichselgartner were triggered by a complaint in February 1988 by the company doctor of 
NTG, who had found out about the illegal activities of Ortmayer and did not wish to keep 
this to himself. For Ortmayer had been dismissed by the company owner shortly before 
for the embezzlement of funds, but not prosecuted because it was feared that the illegal 
business activities of Ortmayer would be discovered (Der Spiegel 1989, 1: 22ff; 
Koppe/Koch 1990: 106, 108). On November 30, 1988 a warrant for his arrest was issued 
by the Gelnhausen District Court (Koppe/Koch 1990: 109). 
The verdict of the Hanau Regional Court had essentially the following content:29 
Rudolf Ortmayer initially worked as a mechanical engineer for NUKEM and Reaktor-
Brennelemente-Union (RBU) in Hanau, and was responsible there for the manufacture of 
nuclear fuel rods. In 1971 he switched to the NTG company in nearby Gelnhausen, and was 
initially production manager there and in 1974 was promoted to independent manager of 
Komplementär-GmbH (Koppe/Koch 1990: 107).  
In 1981 he had contact with the Pakistani citizens Sulfikar Ahmad Butt and Dr. Nyamat 
Ali Javed of the PAEC. Ortmayer learned from his Pakistani acquaintances that Pakistan 
was in a difficult situation at that time in connection with further operation of the heavy-
water moderated and cooled natural uranium fueled, horizontal pressure tube KANUPP I 
reactor supplied by Canada. It was true that Pakistan had become a member of the IAEA, 
but it had refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty and place all its nuclear technology 
plants under the supervision of the IAEA. In order to put pressure on Pakistan Canada had 
 
 
liferation: “At the beginning of 1988 it was claimed in the media that weapons-grade material had been 
misappropriated in Mol and transported to Lübeck by Transnuklear.” There it is alleged to have been 
hidden under coal on a freighter and delivered to Libya or Pakistan via Finland. This material was sup-
posed to have been loaded aboard the ship in the private dock of Neue Metallwerke Lübeck GmbH, which 
is said to belong to the Gokal brothers, two Pakistanis also involved in arms trafficking. This scenario was 
investigated by the committee.” 
26  Loc. cit., p. 7 ff. 
27  Loc. cit., p. 10 left column. 
28  Loc. cit., p. 9 right column. 
29   The presentation is based, partly verbatim, on the court opinion underlying the verdict of the Hanau 
Regional Court of October 29, 1990 – 6 Js 11608/88 KLs. 
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not delivered any more fuel rods to Pakistan since 1975. For this reason, Pakistan was at-
tempting to procure these materials secretly. Ortmayer knew that this special situation 
could lead to profitable business for the NTG company and for him personally.  
Export of zirconium alloy 
As a result, in the period from 1983 to1986 there were 23 exports of a total of 26 tons of 
zirconium alloy material for the production of fuel rod cladding tubes. According to Item 
0104 of the export list, the zirconium alloy required an export license because the alloy 
had a zirconium content of more than 50%. Ortmayer knew that authorization by the 
then Bundesamt für gewerbliche Wirtschaft (Federal Office for Commercial Economics) 
was required for export and that it was unlikely that he would receive this authorization. 
In a conversation with an employee of the BAW he learned that “No-one can rely on [re-
ceiving authorization]. But nobody checks the material to see whether it is stainless steel 
or zirconium.” For this reason he did not even apply for authorization and declared the 
goods as stainless steel. In order to conceal the business relationship of NTG with Paki-
stan he worked through Peter Finke's PTB company. The graduate physicist Finke was 
initially an employee of the GSI Helmholtz Centre for Heavy Ion Research (German: GSI 
Helmholtzzentrum für Schwerionenforschung GmbH) in Darmstadt, Germany. In 1979 
Ortmayer founded PTB together with Finke as a joint engineering office for which Finke 
worked about half-time from 1985, until he left GSI completely in 1987 to work exclusively 
for PTB (Koppe/Koch 1990: 146f). Business was then conducted in the following way: As 
manager of NTG, Ortmayer personally obtained the assignment, and PTB signed the con-
tract with a sham Pakistani trading company behind which stood the PAEC. NTG pur-
chased the material overseas and carried out the export to Pakistan under the name of PTB 
– Peter Finke signed all business-related and customs documents.  
However, in accordance with § 154a StPO these findings were excluded from consid-
eration by the Hanau District Court because, on the basis of a decision by the Darmstadt 
Administrative Court,30 the decision by the Hesse Higher Administrative Court31 on an 
appeal, and the decision on an appeal in another matter by the Federal Administrative 
Court32 which at the time had not yet been announced, there was legal uncertainty about 
whether changes to the export list which had been decided before January 1, 1987 in a so-
called “confidential circulation of documents” were legally binding.  
 
 
30   Verdict of the Darmstadt Administrative Court of January 4, 1988 – III/1 E 652/86. 
31   Verdict of the Hesse Higher Administrative Court of March 19, 1990 – 8 UE 811/88. 
32   Verdict of the Federal Administrative Court of October 17, 1991 – 3 C 45.90. Within the framework of its 
decision on a constitutional objection the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the circulation of 
documents procedure was against the law and the 56th administrative directive on alterations to the 
AWV as well as the 53rd administrative directive on alterations to the export list were not carried out in a 
constitutional way. However, the infringement did not mean that these change directives were null and 
void, the Federal Constitutional Court continued. 
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Later exports led, nonetheless, to a conviction as this legal uncertainty no longer exist-
ed because the German government overturned the confidential circulation of documents 
procedure. The foreign trade regulations which came into force on January 1, 1987 as well 
as the export list related to the regulations were approved in a cabinet meeting on De-
cember 18, 1986.  
On March 18, 1987 the bogus Pakistani PAEC company Margalla Enterprises ordered 
3 tons of zirconium alloy tubes and 750 kg of zirconium sheeting from PTB. Placement of 
the order involved Pakistani diplomatic couriers.33 The execution of the transactions took 
place in tried and true fashion; the tubes and sheeting were declared as stainless steel and 
Finke signed the papers.  
Export of a vacuum induction furnace 
In early 1985, representatives of the PAEC showed an interest in purchasing a furnace for 
smelting natural uranium. Ortmayer prepared a corresponding offer for a vacuum induc-
tion furnace designed specifically for smelting uranium, and received the order on Febru-
ary 19, 1986. 
The sham PAEC company Pakistani Modern Technical Arts in Rawalpindi played the 
part of the customer. Ortmayer and Finke traveled to Pakistan to discuss construction 
details. As a result, it became clear to Ortmayer that the fuel rods to be produced using 
this furnace were not intended for the IAEA-supervised heavy-water reactor KANUPP I, 
because its nuclear fuel rods consisted of uranium dioxide pellets, but for an unknown 
reactor not under IAEA supervision. The vacuum induction furnace was completed by 
NTG partly by buying components and partly by constructing it itself. According to Item 
0204 of the export list, export of the vacuum induction furnace required authorization 
because it had been designed specifically for manufacturing nuclear fuel rods. Ortmayer 
knew that the furnace required export authorization and that he would not receive au-
thorization to export it. For this reason he did not submit an application for an export 
license and when exporting the smelting furnace to Pakistan declared it as “scientific 
equipment” on July 30, 1987.  
Export of a rod-straightening machine 
Although Ortmayer had presented the Pakistanis with a concept for a complete plant for 
producing uranium fuel rods consisting of a total of 25 components including the vacu-
um induction furnace (the so-called R line),34 he now received an order for a further indi-
vidual component – a straightening machine needed for straightening the cast uranium 
rods. However, this was needed to meet the requirements for straightening zirconium 
 
 
33   It was also possible to prove the involvement of Pakistani diplomats in other criminal proceedings.  
34   The account given by Koppe/Koch 1990 is different: 116f. According to them, Ortmayer sold and exported 
the entire R line.  
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alloy tube cladding they themselves manufactured. After NTG had received the order 
from the PAEC, this time through the sham “Directorate of Technical Procurement,” 
through Peter Finke’s contacts NTG turned to a German manufacturer which built the 
straightening machine. Pakistani engineers took delivery of the machine from NTG. Ac-
cording to Item 0204 of the export list, export of the rod-straightening machine required 
export license because it had been specifically designed for manufacturing nuclear fuel 
rods. Without any application for an export license, the machine, which required export 
license, was declared as “scientific goods” as part of being processed for export to Pakistan 
on December 16, 1987.  
Export of a tritium handling system 
In addition, Ortmayer sold and exported a tritium handling system and 8,000 curies35 of 
highly purified tritium to his customers in Pakistan. Dr. Weichselgartner, who was also 
convicted, had a key role in these transactions. Dr. Weichselgartner was the longstanding 
head of the tritium laboratory at the Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics in Garching 
nearby München, Germany. The institute works on the development of fusion reactor 
technology. Though very rare, trace amounts of tritium occur in nature and can be ob-
tained from lithium 6 artificially in a breeder reactor. It is as an unwanted byproduct in 
heavy-water moderated natural uranium reactors – such as at the KANUPP I nuclear 
power plant in Karachi, Pakistan. Tritium can be used for civilian purposes in the produc-
tion of self-illuminated fluorescent lamps and self-luminous paint. Militarily, the explo-
sive force of bombs made from uranium or plutonium can be substantially increased with 
tritium that is more than 95% pure in combination with deuterium. 
On May 8, 1984 S. A. Butt, who carried out the procurement transactions from the Pa-
kistani Embassy in Paris from 1975 to 1985, contacted Ortmayer with the request to sub-
mit a quote for a plant for the recovery of tritium from heavy water as well as a quote for 
the delivery of 500 liters of highly purified tritium. Ortmayer contacted Dr. 
Weichselgartner, in whose laboratory a laboratory-scale tritium recovery plant was locat-
ed. Dr. Weichselgartner notified him about the radiation intensity of 500 liters of tritium 
– 1.3 million curies – quoted a price – DM3.4 million – and possible sources of supply. He 
also provided documents about the tritium recovery plant of a Swiss manufacturer. 
Because the PAEC could not decide whether they wanted to buy tritium or produce it 
from heavy water, discussions took place with the Pakistanis in April 1984. Dr. Javed de-
clared in the presence of Ortmayer and Finke that a not particularly detailed quote for a 
tritium recovery plant was required so that a decision could be made either for a plant or 
for the purchase of tritium. From the quote provided by Ortmayer for a plant complex 
consisting of a tritium recovery plant, a post-purification plant to achieve 95% purity, a 
tritium handling plant and a cleaning system for plant air at the tritium handling plant, 
 
 
35  Curie – a unit no longer used nowadays; replaced by the Becquerel; 1 Ci = 37 GBq. 
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the Pakistanis ultimately purchased only the tritium handling plant including the cleaning 
system for the plant air36 at the facility. The plant was exported in individual parts de-
clared as “technical equipment” (Koppe/Koch 1990: 132) and “technical parts” in 1986 
and put into operation in Pakistan by Peter Finke. 
Export of tritium 
In October 1984, S. A. Butt initially did so verbally, and somewhat later the Pakistani cov-
er organization Margalla Enterprises, placed an order with Ortmayer for the delivery of 
8,000 curies (2.96e+14 becquerel) of tritium. In November 1984 Dr. Weichselgartner ar-
ranged a meeting between Ortmayer and representatives of the Swiss company R. 
Chemie, a manufacturer of tritium, who explained to Ortmayer that a purchase was only 
possible through their German business partner, company G. Dr. Weichselgartner made 
contact with this company which made an offer addressed to Dr. Weichselgartner for 
“8,000 curies of tritium, not under international supervision, 95% pure for DM11.80 per 
curie.” Dr. Weichselgartner advised them that the actual order would be made by Peter 
Finke of IBS, who would also provide the exact delivery address. As a sole proprietor, 
Finke ran IBS-Industrieberatungsservice (as well as the PTB company) as a commercial 
operation. When Finke named Pakistan as the recipient to the G. company, the owner of 
the company contacted the BAW, which informed him that the export of tritium to all 
countries in the world required an export license. In the case of export to Pakistan, a dec-
laration of the intended use would have to be provided by the recipient. The BAW did not 
mention that in the case of the export of tritium not only an export license in accordance 
with the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (AWG) had to be applied for but also authori-
zation in accordance with the War Weapons Control Act, which was issued not by the 
BAW but by the BMWi. For tritium is on the War Weapons List (KWL), which is an ap-
pendix to the War Weapons Control Act (KWKG). Company G. notified Dr. 
Weichselgartner about the requirement for an export license and he in turn notified 
Ortmayer.  
The individuals involved in carrying out the transaction acted in the following way:  
Because they realized a license for Pakistan would probably not be issued by the BAW, 
they chose to pretend that the delivery of the tritium gas would be to a recipient in Hong 
Kong – company J. – because they were expecting to receive an export license from the 
BAW for a recipient in Hong Kong. The tritium containers were to be sent to this com-
pany in Hong Kong as though they were full, but in reality would be empty; at the same 
time, containers declared to be empty, but which in fact would be filled with tritium, were 
to be delivered to Pakistan.  
 
 
36   For more detailed information about the tritium handling plant and purification system, see the descrip-
tions in Koppe/Koch 1990: 130ff. 
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Initially, the company G. could only supply 5,000 curies. Company G. was told that the 
recipient of the tritium would be company J. in Hong Kong and a forged end-use declara-
tion from company J. was provided. In June 1986 the BAW issued an export license for 
the export of the tritium to Hong Kong – for use in the “manufacture of self-luminous 
paints” – endorsed with the requirement that a customs certificate from the receiving 
country should be forwarded later. At NTG the shipping documents – invoice, packing 
list, shipping order – were then prepared under the company name “IBS,” with the de-
scription of the goods entered as “5 pc storage tanks.” The shipping company collected 
the tritium filled containers from the German company G. and the ones declared as emp-
ty and bound for Pakistan from NTG. The accompanying papers were switched around 
and both shipments sent to Frankfurt by air freight for customs clearance. The five con-
tainers filled with tritium left the Federal Republic on Flight PK 806 bound for Karachi. 
After the containers, which were in fact empty, had arrived in Hong Kong and cleared 
customs, the shipping company allowed NTG to recall them as shipped empty by mistake. 
Company G. received the confirmation of customs processing in Hong Kong for presen-
tation to the BAW. 
In March 1986 the second delivery of 3,000 curies of tritium to Pakistan took place in 
the same way.  
Verdict of the Regional Court of Hanau 
On account of the actions described above and others, 
• Ortmayer was sentenced to five years in prison 
• and Finke to a prison term of three years and nine months and 
• Dr. Weichselgartner to a prison term of one year and one month, suspended on pro-
bation, 
by the Hanau Regional Court on October 29, 1990. Dr. Weichselgartner submitted an 
appeal against the verdict which was decided by the Federal Supreme Court in a decision 
handed down on January 31, 199237. The appeal was unsuccessful. 
Holger Koppe/Egmont R. Koch also reported that NTG exported 130 tons of raw alu-
minum for the construction of gas ultracentrifuges – in 80x50 cm blocks – to Khan Re-
search Laboratories (KRL), from which centrifuges – presumably the outer shells, the so-
called recipients (also called casings or housings) – were constructed (Koppe/Koch 1990: 
117). The verdict of the Hanau Regional Court does not contain any references to this. 
This may result from the fact that at the time of the export aluminum blocks were not 
included on the export list (AL) and Art. 4 of the EU Dual Use Regulations, according to 
which even unlisted goods could require an export license, did not yet exist.  
 
 
37   Verdict of the Federal Supreme Court of January 31, 1992 – 2 StR 250/91 – published in ZfZ 1992, 184ff 
with comments by Ricke. 
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3.4 Criminal proceedings against Heinz Mebus/Martin S.  
One of the most important procurers for the Pakistani atomic (weapons) program was the 
German engineer Heinz Mebus, a close friend of A. Q. Khan since their Berlin student 
days (Koch 1988: 229; Koppe/Koch 1990: 60). Even in the early 1980s there was already 
evidence of procurements for Pakistan by him and his company, the engineering office H. 
Mebus VDI in Erlangen – later the Mebus & S. Handelsgesellschaft mbH – in connection 
with unauthorized exports to Pakistan by Albrecht Migule form 1977 to April 1980 (see 
above). Mebus was substantially involved in the crimes of Albrecht Migules – export of 
complete plants for the production of uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan. Despite this there 
is no evidence that he has been the subject of investigations. The leads in German publica-
tions which later continuously appeared were not sufficient for a criminal investigation on 
suspicion of offenses against the AWG or the KWKG to be initiated (Koppe/Koch 1990: 
67ff). Foreign trade audits and customs clearence of goods being shipped by Mebus also 
failed to produce information which would have justified a criminal investigation. It is the 
fault of the inadequate possibilities of both foreign trade and payment audits according to § 
44 AWG and customs clearance measures according to § 46 AWG that serious infringe-
ments of the AWG or the KWKG are rarely detected during these checks. For instance, the 
foreign trade audits must rely on the company to provide all the required documents; the 
officer has no right to carry out searches. In the case of export clearance, the detection of 
unauthorized exports mostly fails because the customs official lacks technical knowledge.  
In the spring of 1992 the Customs Criminological Office (ZKA) obtained the right to 
monitor telecommunications and mail when concrete evidence justifies the assumption 
that somebody is planning violations of substantial significance of the AWG or the 
KWKG38 (§§ 39 ff AWG – since annulled and replaced by §§ 23a ff of the Customs Inves-
tigation Service Act – ZFdG).  
After Mebus was again mentioned as a procurer for Pakistan’s military nuclear pro-
gram by foreign sources in 1992, on October 23, 1992 the ZKA lodged an application with 
the Cologne District Court to order surveillance of the mail and telephone calls of Heinz 
Mebus and his son-in-law, the managing director of the Mebus & S. Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH, Martin S. 
The suspicion that unauthorized exports were being planned was very quickly con-
firmed. The surveillance also made it possible to identify and corroborate related offenses 
previously committed. Consequently, on April 8, 1993 the Nuremberg-Fürth District 
Attorney commenced a criminal action against Martin S. (Mebus had died on December 
 
 
38   Law on Amendment of the AWG, the StGB and other Laws of February 28, 1992 – BGBl. I: 372ff; see 
Ricke 2011: 92ff on specific details of preventive telecommunication and mail surveillance.  
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6, 1992). Martin S. and an accomplice were sentenced by the Nuremberg-Fürth District 
Court to two years and to 10 months in prison respectively, suspended on probation.39  
The following material is based to a considerable degree on the contents of the verdict: 
The District Court started by stating “in order to procure the equipment required for 
the isotope separation plant (plant for uranium enrichment by means of gas ultracentri-
fuges ) Dr. Khan or members of the KRL acting on his instructions, who participated in 
the organization of shipments declared as Civil Works Organisation – CWO, [ap-
proached] the engineer Heinz Mebus from approximately the end of the 1970s, or during 
the same general time period the accused Martin S., who on behalf of the companies they 
represented […] accepted the orders, had the goods manufactured and delivered them to 
the customer.” The engineering firm Heinz Mebus was involved “exclusively with the 
delivery of industrial equipment and technical parts to Khan Research Laboratories […] 
in Rawalpindi, Pakistan or to the Civil Works Organisation, which was under the control 
of KRL […].”  
Martin S. began working for his father-in-law’s company in 1988, initially as a clerk, 
but, due to the serious illness of his father-in-law, starting in 1990 he was obligated to take 
over management of the company to a greater and greater extent. In January 1992 S. was 
appointed managing director of the newly founded Mebus und S. Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH, Baiersdorf. Because he was only fully responsible for exports carried out starting 
with his joining the company, the Nuremberg-Fürth District Court dropped the charges 
involving unauthorized exports pursuant to § 154 StPO dating from April 28, 1988 to 
December 8, 1991. The verdict thus did not involve the crimes of Heinz Mebus, which 
date back to the 1970s, but only those of his son-in-law, who however continued the busi-
ness as his father-in-law would have done while employing his means and methods.  
In the period from January 9, 1992 to March 31, 1993 S. exported technical equipment 
worth approximately DM 800,000 to CWO in Rawalpinde, Pakistan. In three cases, with 
an accomplice he exported electronic components and computer software worth approx-
imately DM 265,000 to CWO. In all cases he neglected to apply for an export license from 
the Federal Office of Economics (BAW), although he knew that the goods were intended 
for the operation of a KRL nuclear technology plant and several parts in the delivery were 
specified in the export control list. 
The court said the following concerning the modus operandi: 
“In delivering the technical equipment and the electronic components Tradinor Inc., 
Zürich, which is a mailbox company under the control of the accused or Heinz Mebus, 
was used. All deliveries were invoiced to this company and – in part with substantial 
markups – invoicing subsequently submitted to CWO. In this process, the billing and 
sundry written communications of Tradinor were carried out in the offices of the Mebus 
 
 
39   Verdict of the Nuremberg-Fürth District Court of March 13, 1997 – 12 KLs 152 Js 439/93. 
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und Serr Handelsgesellschaft or Ingenieurbüro Heinz Mebus, using billing forms, letter-
head, stamps, etc., of Tradinor. Payments by CWO were made to Tradinor bank accounts 
in Switzerland. 
In the freight documents and customs declarations in addition to CWO, bogus com-
panies in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates were listed as supposed recipients in order to 
conceal the real recipients of the goods, KRL.”  
The most important business carried out by S. in the time period in question was the 
export of ring magnets. Ring magnets are basic components of every gas ultracentrifuge. 
The rotor in the recipient – the external visible cladding of a gas ultracentrifuge – rotates 
on a needle sharp point. In order to ensure that the rotor remains straight it is necessary 
to stabilize it at the upper end too. This is done contact-free using a magnetic bearing, the 
so-called ring magnet. The ring magnet must have certain exact dimensions and be made 
from a particular alloy. 
On the basis of an order from KRL in August 1991, S. had 48 ring magnets manufac-
tured as specimens for a larger delivery at a later time, and exported them. To conceal the 
destination and the recipient – KRL –, in the freight papers he listed the non-existent 
Technoglobe in Dubai as the intended recipient. Ingenieurbüro Mebus invoiced the ring 
magnets to Tradinor Zürich, which in turn billed the shipment to CWO in Swiss francs. 
CWO’s payment was made to the account of the letterbox company Tradinor at a Swiss 
bank. 
At the end of 1991 the KRL director responsible for purchasing technical equipment, 
Mohammad Farooq, ordered 9,508 of the ring magnets described above. S. had them 
manufactured at a magnet factory and exported them to CWO on February 12, 1992 
without applying for the license needed for their export. Once again, Technoglobe of Du-
bai was listed as the recipient. Payment was carried out as follows: Mebus and S. GmbH 
billed the ring magnets to the firm Tradinor, Zürich, which for its part billed Technoglobe 
of Dubai for the goods, which then invoiced the magnets to CWO in Pakistan. Payment 
was made to the account of Tradinor, Zürich. 
In June 1991, Dr. Atta, director of the Process Division of the KRL, ordered two pro-
cess cooling plants from S. S. and Dr. Atta had previously been at the German manufac-
turer and had examined equipment for that purpose. S. placed an order with the German 
manufacturer but listed Tradinor, Zürich, as the customer, and produced a confirmation 
from Sitara Chemical Industries Ltd, Feisalabad, in which this company was identified as 
the final customer. In this document, use in chemical production was given as the intend-
ed use. Using these documents S. submitted an application to the Federal Office of Eco-
nomics for the issue of a so-called negative certificate – referred to today as “advice on 
information from the list of goods”. A clearance certificate was always issued by the BAW 
when the goods to be exported were not on the list. The clearance certificate was used for 
presentation to customs in order to eliminate possible doubt about the need for a license. 
Had the BAW known the true recipient (KLR) and the true intended use (use in the ura-
nium enrichment plant), it would have demanded an application for an export license 
from S. which would then have been refused. 
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At the request of S., the plants were delivered directly to CWO by the German manu-
facturer. The manufacturer billed Tradinor, Zürich, approximately DM 367,000. Tradinor 
Zürich billed CWO DM 400,000, which was transferred to the Swiss account of Tradinor, 
Zürich.  
In October 1992 Mohammad Farooq ordered 20 square meters of Viton sheeting. Vi-
ton sheeting is used as a sealing material for a gas ultracentrifuge plant, in this case the 
one of KRL, about which S was aware. He had the sheeting manufactured and delivered to 
CWO without submitting the required application for an export license. Mebus and S. 
billed Tradinor, Zürich for the sheeting. The sheeting was then billed to CWO in the 
name of Tradinor, Panama, which paid the invoiced amounts. 
In April 1993 the business activities of the companies ended abruptly as a result of the 
opening of the criminal investigation, especially the searching of their premises. The ex-
tremely extensive investigation was completed in December 1994, and in January 1996 
the Nuremberg-Fürth District Attorney pressed charges. The two offenders, S. and F., 
were convicted on March 13, 1997. 
As a result of the criminal investigation the business activity of the companies came to 
a standstill. Business relations with Pakistan were broken off completely, and the compa-
nies involved in the Pakistan business dissolved.  
3.5 Criminal proceedings against Ernst Piffl 
Exports by Team Industries under its manager Ernst Piffl for the uranium enrichment 
plant of KRL in Kahuta took place at an early stage. Der Spiegel had already reported in its 
edition of November 12, 1979 (46: 202ff) about the delivery of 31 high-frequency invert-
ers which Emerson Electric Industrial Controls in Swindon, UK exported to Rawalpindi, 
Pakistan via Team Industries, Leonberg for DM 2,154,000. The equipment was flown 
directly to Rawalpindi from London. At that time the Emerson company was also supply-
ing the British uranium enrichment plant in Capenhurst with high-frequency inverters. 
In an uranium enrichment plant high-frequency converters are used to convert alternat-
ing current into direct current. Since at that time the transaction was a license-free transit 
trade transaction for Team Industries, no violation of the AWG was committed, meaning 
no criminal investigation could be instigated.40 
Team Industries was repeatedly mentioned in the press after this as well (Der Spiegel 
1989, 4: 24 and 1989, 8: 62ff), however, coverage was always in connection with the high-
frequency converter business from 1979.  
 
 
40   Due to the legal situation at that time there were also no criminal consequences for the British company 
Emerson – Weissman/Krosney 1981: 187f. 
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As is the case with Martin S., who carried on Heinz Mebus’s business after his illness 
and death, Ernst Piffl is also a son-in-law of Heinz Mebus (Albright 2010: 47). He may 
have made contact with Dr. A. Q. Khan through him.  
Through surveillance of the telecommunications of Team Industries, the Customs 
Criminological Office discovered that on October 14, 1993 Ernst Piffl, manager of Team 
Industries, tried to export gas ultracentrifuge components to Pakistan from Stuttgart Air-
port. The parts, which were declared as “prefabricated ballpoint pen casings” in the customs 
declaration were in reality so-called scoops, which are gas ultracentrifuge components. The 
goods were confiscated and an inquiry opened (Der Spiegel 1994, 50: 57).  
The inquiry essentially led to the following result:41 
Until October 1993 – confiscation of the scoops at Stuttgart Airport – through his 
company, Team Industries, Piffl had a business relationship with Khan Research Labora-
tories (KRL) in Kahuta, Pakistan via the Pakistani Embassy in Bonn. In this period he 
supplied on the one hand parts and equipment for the uranium enrichment plant in large 
quantities, on the other acceleration gauges and components for rocket propellants for the 
Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), which were 
listed in the export control list part 1, section C, item 7A101 or in the export control list 
part 1, section A, item 0008, and thus required an export license, without applying for 
one. In addition, he exported armaments and weapons technology in large quantities to 
the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) without authorization.  
The most significant were the exports for the uranium enrichment plant. This in-
volved the scoops already mentioned, ring magnets, and in addition so-called “axes” (see 
below) and a rotary swaging machine for bending the scoops.  
In essence, the court came to the following conclusions regarding the function of the 
exported parts: A gas ultracentrifuge consists of a rotor which is located in a housing in 
which there is a vacuum so that at its high speed of rotation the rotor will not be made red 
hot by the air resistance that would otherwise exist. Because of the extremely high number 
of revolutions, the rotor is only anchored at its lower end by means of a special axis in a 
special bearing. The upper bearing consists of two ring-shaped magnets; they keep the 
rotor floating without contact so that it functions like a gyroscope. Uranium hexafluoride 
is fed into the rotor. Because of the difference in mass of the isotopes uranium-235 and 
uranium-238, which are contained in different quantities in the uranium hexafluoride, 
during the rotation differences in concentration occur at certain locations. At these loca-
tions the uranium-235 enriched uranium hexafluoride and the uranium-235 depleted 
uranium hexafluoride are removed by scoops. The scoops are thin tubes or preforms on 
which final machining and forming is done after installation in the centrifuge. 
 
 
41   The presentation is based on the findings in the verdict of the Stuttgart District Court of July 18, 1998 – 11 
KLs 181 Js 85721/93. 
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After the staff member of the Pakistani Embassy responsible for undercover procure-
ment approached Piffl in March 1988 and inquired whether Piffl could supply scoops and 
axes a contract was signed on April 18, 1988 between Team Industries and the Pakistani 
Embassy for the supply of 5,000 each of “W spindles,” “P spindles” and axes. What was 
meant by the term “spindles” was scoops, with “P” standing for “product” (enriched ura-
nium) and “W” for “waste” (depleted material). The recipient was to be the “Directorate 
of Technical Procurement,” although the real recipient was the KRL, as Piffl also knew. 
He knew, or at the least assumed, that the items would be used as gas ultracentrifuge 
components. He also knew that for this reason the goods required an export license and 
that a license would not have been granted if he had applied to the BAW for one. 
As a result, in the period from July 1988 to February 5, 1989 he exported a total of ap-
proximately 10,000 “P” scoops and “W” scoops, the first shipment being a test shipment 
and involving only 10 “P” scoops and seven “W” scoops. After this trial shipment was 
approved by the KRL the remaining shipments followed successfully. Payment in the 
amount of DM 200,000 was completed through the Pakistani Embassy in Bonn.  
On the basis of a new contract dated August 10, 1990 Piffl supplied – also after a trial 
shipment – a total of about 5,000 “P” and “W” scoops. A further contract dated December 
9, 1991 involved the supply of approximately 11,200 scoops.  
On April 3, 1992 Piffl made an offer to the Pakistani Embassy to supply a semi-
automatic swaging machine for bending the scoops at a price of DM 300,000. The Paki-
stani Embassy forwarded the contract to Piffl. “Manufacture of ballpoint pen parts” was 
given as the intended use; the “Institute of Industrial Automation” was indicated as the 
recipient, who were known to Piffl to carry out procurement for the KRL. When the ex-
port officer of Team Industries inquired at the BAFA whether the export of the machine 
would be approved, the BAFA expressed concerns about the Pakistani recipient, the Insti-
tute of Industrial Automation. Piffl then entered the Pakistani ballpoint pen manufacturer 
Sayyed Engineers in the application for export approval. The Federal Office of Economics 
and Export Control (BAFA) then informed Team Industries that there were no concerns 
about the export of the machine to this recipient. On September 7, 1993 Piffl exported the 
machine to Pakistan.  
In a contract signed on September 8, 1993 Piffl agreed to supply 8,000 scoops. The first 
partial delivery of 1,000 scoops to Pakistan was to be carried out on October 14/15, 1993 
via Stuttgart Airport. However, the Stuttgart Airport customs office did not clear this 
shipment, instead demanding that the exporter submit a negative certificate issued by the 
BAFA (today: advice on the list of goods). The scoops were seized by customs pending 
final settlement of the matter. Piffl submitted altered drawings to the BAFA and the appli-
cation forms referred to the scoops as “aluminum semi-finished products for the con-
struction of ballpoint pen casings.” At the same time, Piffl delivered an end-use certificate 
which supposedly came from Sayyed Engineers (Private) Ltd, the Pakistan-based ball-
point pen manufacturer in Lahore. In reality, Piffl had issued the end-use certificate him-
self and signed it using an invented name. 
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Because the real facts were known to the investigating agencies through telecommuni-
cation surveillance, the stratagem failed. The scoops were confiscated. Following the in-
vestigation, further shipments were blocked.  
Piffl was sentenced by the Stuttgart District Court to a prison term totaling three years 
and nine months for offenses against the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and for other 
crimes, and was fined DM 432,000.  
3.6 Criminal proceedings against executives of Company V.42 
In the course of the investigation of executive T. of company O. on grounds of unauthor-
ized export of aluminum tubes – intended for the manufacture of casings for gas ultra-
centrifuges – to North Korea, in May 2003, the company executive V. in P. was suspected 
of exporting goods to Pakistan without official authorization where such permission was 
compulsory. The Customs Investigation Office responsible in Stuttgart began an investi-
gation and searched the offices of the company on June 16, 2003 after being granted a 
search warrant by the relevant local court. Suspicions of an offense were corroborated 
further by the order book found during the search as well as by the subsequent KOBRA 
research.43 In May 2004 the Customs Investigation Office informed the relevant District 
Attorney’s Office (Munich I). The district attorney obtained authorization from the rele-
vant local court for telecommunications surveillance according to §§ 100a German Code 
of Criminal Procedure (StPO) as well as a search and seizure warrant, which was executed 
on November 24, 2004. V. was arrested on November 23, 2004. 
The accused was charged on May 17, 2005 and sentenced by the First Munich District 
Court on November 24, 2005. The charges involving known violations of the War Weap-
ons Control Act (KWKG) which were part of the overall crime were dropped in accord-
ance with § 154 a (2) German Code of Criminal Procedure.44 
In its verdict the District Court ruled that in the period from November 1999 to Octo-
ber 2004, the executive V. of company V. had infringed the Foreign Trade and Payments 
Act in 23 cases, two cases of which were only attempts because it was possible to stop 
these exports as a result of the investigation.  
On April 25, 2000 V. had signed an agency agreement with a company located in Is-
lamabad, on the basis of which the company in Pakistan was commissioned to obtain 
orders for company V. on a commission basis. By 2004, company V. had received over 
300 inquiries from Pakistan for the supply of a wide variety of goods on the basis of this 
 
 
42   Süddeutsche Zeitung of November 18, 2005: 9; FOCUS 2005: 39: 62. 
43   KOBRA (export control) was the information processing system of the customs administration until 
August 1, 2006 when it was replaced by the ATLAS Ausfuhr electronic customs administration system. 
44   Verdict of the First Munich District Court of November 24, 2005 – 6 KLs 115 Js 11042/04. 
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arrangement. Among the inquiries were 25 involving the supply of vacuum technology, a 
key technology for the construction of uranium enrichment plants. In addition, certain 
materials such as special steels and aluminum were requested which, because of their 
unique properties, could also be used in uranium enrichment.  
It was in this way that numerous contracts were signed with Pakistani companies such as 
Victor Star Ltd., TechNet Corporation Ltd., Lodgeaction Ltd., Matrix Technical Services 
and A.H. Associates (FOCUS 2005, 39: 62), which serve as cover organizations for the Paki-
stan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) or the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). The 
real recipients of the goods exported in this way were the PAEC and the KRL.  
For instance, in 2001 company V. repeatedly exported spare parts for filament winding 
machines to Pakistan, in each case declaring them as “replacement parts for water sprin-
kler equipment” to customs. Among other applications, filament winding machines are 
used in the manufacture of rotors for gas ultracentrifuges or for the manufacture of mis-
sile casings, and – depending on how the filament winding machines can be used – re-
quire an export license. Despite being explicitly warned by the supplier about the possible 
need for an export license, V. did not apply for a license.  
Following a Pakistani inquiry, V. purchased 100 kg of a certain carbon fiber from a 
German supplier. The German company pointed out that an export license was required. 
Carbon fibers are cited in Appendix 1 of the EU dual-use regulations as well as in part 1 of 
Appendix AL of the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation, Item I C 210, and thus re-
quire an export license. Carbon fibers are processed on fiber winding machines to manu-
facture such items as rotors for gas ultracentrifuges or to manufacture missile 
components. Although V. knew about the requirement for an export license, he did not 
submit an application for an export license, instead shipping the carbon fibers from Mu-
nich to Pakistan by air freight in September 2002 while falsely declaring them as glass fibers 
and stating the goods were worth less than their real value.  
In addition, V. exported spare parts for a mass spectrometer, special metal sheeting, 
various pumps with accessories and vacuum technology equipment without the required 
export license. 
The First Munich District Court sentenced V. to seven years and three months in pris-
on and refused to grant the company V. compensation in the amount of Euro 150,000.45 
Because both the convicted and the District Attorney resigned the right to appeal, the 
verdict came into force immediately. This is the highest prison sentence ever handed 
down by a German court for a proliferation offense. If this sentence is compared with the 
sentence given to Albrecht Migule (eight months in prison suspended on probation for an 
objectively far more serious crime), it is evident how much the attitude to proliferation 
offenses has changed in the meantime.  
 
 
45   Verdict of the First Munich District Court of November 24, 2005 – 6 KLs 115 Js 11042/04. 
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4. Nuclear Tests in 1998 
While the trial of Ernst Piffl was still taking place before the Stuttgart District Court be-
tween March 9 and July 20, 1998, first India on May 11 (Der Spiegel 1998, 21: 162ff) and 
then Pakistan on May 28 and 30, 1998 carried out nuclear testing. 
Many years of preparation preceded Pakistan’s tests. Initial, so-called cold tests – tests 
without fissile material – took place on March 11, 1983 under the leadership of Dr. Ishfaq 
Ahmed of the PAEC in tunnels in the Kirana Hills near Sarghoda. In March 1984, KRL 
conducted its own tests near Kahuta (Sublette 2002: 2). By 1981, the later site of the atom-
ic tests had already been viewed and selected – the Chagai Hills in the Balochistan Prov-
ince of western Pakistan. While KRL was responsible for the production of the necessary 
fissile material – uranium-235 – the PAEC worked on the production of the actual bomb, 
especially the detonator. Chinese scientists are said to have been helpful in this regard.46 
In political terms, India’s nuclear test on March 11, 1998 on the Pokhran test site cre-
ated the ideal situation for Pakistan to start conducting its own tests. The Pakistanis were 
taken completely by surprise by India’s nuclear test (Der Spiegel 1998, 21: 162ff). In sever-
al meetings of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) under the leadership of the 
then Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif the Pakistanis decided to conduct their 
own nuclear tests within fourteen days. Representatives of both the PAEC and KRL par-
ticipated in the meetings, and the rivalry between the two institutes was once again evi-
dent: Both wanted to be given responsibility for the tests, and assured that they would be 
able to conduct the tests within 10 days. In the end, the PAEC won. A. Q. Khan obtained 
the concession that he could be present during final preparations for the test and at the 
test itself (Azam 2000: 5f).  
The Pakistani scientist Dr. Samar Mubarak Mand was put in charge of the tests (Azam 
2000: 6). The tests were scheduled for May 28, 1998 at 3:00 PM. In the early hours of May 
28, 1998 Pakistan cut off automatic transmission of data from its seismographic stations 
to foreign countries, and the Pakistani armed forces were mobilized. At 2:30 PM a Paki-
stani army helicopter brought the observer team to the observation post, which was locat-
ed 10 km from the test site. PAEC Chairman, Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed, KRL Director Dr. A. Q. 
Khan and four other KRL scientists were part of the observer team. At 3:16 PM, the ex-
plosions were set off. A short time after that the earth shook and the mountain was 
cloaked in a beige cloud of smoke (Azam 2000: 7f). 
Pakistan conducted a further nuclear test on May 30, 1998 in Kharan, a flat desert val-
ley 150 km south of the Ras Koh Hills. The explosive force is believed to have been sub-
 
 
46   Sublette 2002: 3: “In July 1984 the New York Times reported that US intelligence had learned that the 
previous year that China had supplied Pakistan with the design of an actual tested nuclear device – the de-
sign of China’s fourth nuclear weapon tested in 1966 with a yield of 25 kt. That is said to be a low weight 
(200 kg class) solid-core bomb design.” 
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stantially less, although it is not known whether one or two explosive charges were in-
volved (Azam 2000: 8).  
In a resolution of June 6, 1998 the UN Security Council unanimously condemned In-
dia and Pakistan for their atomic tests47 and called upon both states to conduct no further 
test, to close down their atomic weapons programs immediately and to become members 
of the non-proliferation treaty. 
On March 12, 1999 Dr. A. Q. Khan was (again) awarded 48 the highest Pakistani civil-
ian order for his services: “Nishan-e-Imtiaz” (Order of Excellence). 
5. Closing Remarks  
Looking back at the time from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, the situation is best 
summarized in the words of Holger Koppe and Egmont R. Koch, who in 1990 wrote in 
their book “Booming Deals – Deadly Weapons for the Third World”: “If you take NTG, 
Leybold, Team and Messrs. Migule and Mebus together, Pakistan was able to fulfill nearly 
all its wishes from the mid-1970s to 1988 with West German help, from uranium hexaflu-
oride production to centrifuge enrichment technology, through to fuel rod production 
and tritium technology, including the necessary computer technology and other equip-
ment for building bombs. The companies and individuals named are examples only. 
Many, many others played an active role in the export business, partly below the approval 
threshold, and partly by exploiting gray areas in German foreign trade law. […] Because 
India also diligently used West German suppliers for their nuclear armament program, 
the arms race on the subcontinent will probably continue in the future.” (Koppe/Koch 
1990: 151, 153).  
Indirectly, these exports have also contributed to Pakistan itself being able to act as a 
proliferator, as the second criminal case against Gotthard Lerch (see above) and other 
proceedings abroad against accomplices of Abdul Qadeer Khan have shown. 
In the subsequent period (1990 to 2000) a rethinking process has taken place in Ger-
many, and legal and practical measures have been taken to effectively address prolifera-
tion. Only as a result of this have there been notable investigative successes and 
prevention of unauthorized exports since 1990. But these – in particular German national 
– measures are not nearly enough. In terms of “combating proliferation” little has been 
seen or heard in recent decades from other highly industrialized European nations such as 
the UK and France.  
 
 
47   Resolution 1172 (1998) of the UN Security Council of June 6, 1998 – www.un.org. 
48   On the first occasion in 1989 he received this order at the level of “Hilal-i-Imtiaz” – Defence Journal 
1990/12: 12, then the highest level, “Nishan-i-Imtiaz,” for the first time on August 14, 1996.  
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But in any case there must be no facilitation of arms deliveries, be it delivery to EU 
member states or export to third-world countries. On the contrary, the federal government 
should insist that other EU member states too reach the standards attained in Germany. 
So what should be done to deal more effectively with the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction than in the past?  
As a highly industrialized and extremely export-oriented country, the Federal Republic 
of Germany plays a prominent role in the fight against proliferation. But for some years, 
German export controls have been focused on only one area: the nuclear armament of 
Iran. This topic is certainly of paramount importance because with the possession of nu-
clear weapons by Iran, the balance of power in the Near East and Middle East will change, 
and since Iran is also already in possession of long-range missiles today, the threat not 
only to Israel but also to Europe is growing. Efforts to procure weapons of mass destruc-
tion involve not only nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons; pro-
curements are being carried out not only by Iran but also by other states, and still by 
Pakistan (Stricker 2011). Even countries that were previously not in focus, such as My-
anmar, have been suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons in the last few years (Selth 
2007). This danger could be averted through the hopefully ongoing process of liberaliza-
tion in Myanmar. But at present, you cannot be sure. Taiwan also represents a danger, 
although at least publicly there is no evidence whatsoever of the procurement of weapons 
of mass destruction. South America should also come into the picture, and here in partic-
ular Brazil and Argentina, who were the focus of German export controls years ago. How-
ever, not only the procuring countries are of interest, but also the conduit countries. Who 
would have thought a few years ago that Malaysia could be involved in obtaining nuclear 
technology, as the procurement network of A. Q. Khan has shown? 
Although the Customs Administration of the Federal Republic of Germany employs 
rather large numbers of staff in comparison to other European countries, this extensive 
task can only be mastered if the countries in which procurement efforts originate employ 
more and better-trained staff who are able to evaluate the enormous amount of data 
available for dealing with individual areas of proliferation (ABC weapons, missiles).  
The existing export control instruments should be maintained and developed further. 
Thus the monitoring of telecommunications, correspondence and postal traffic49 in Ger-
many has proved its value and is indispensable as a source of information for preventive 
and repressive measures. The number of foreign trade audits has again been falling for 
years. Considering the fact that tens of thousands of German companies take part in for-
eign trade, the 1,000 audits carried out per year is far too low.  
 
 
49   For details see Ricke 2011: 192ff.  
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One must always break new ground. So in certain specific cases post-shipment control is 
a sensible measure.50 The federal government should therefore review its opposing stance. 
Preventive seizure of goods has existed in Germany since 2007.51 The Customs Inves-
tigation Service should make use of it as often as possible. For prevention is more im-
portant than the repressive measures of criminal proceedings. An amendment to § 32b 
Customs Investigation Service Act (ZFdG) would be desirable, according to which pre-
ventive seizure is also possible, even if the danger is not currently present. 
However the crucial factor for effectively combating proliferation in all areas of pro-
curement of weapons of mass destruction is situated at the European level. Germany has 
made great progress in combating proliferation from the 1970s until today, and at times 
even took a pioneering role with its national regulations on export control. But Germany 
got stuck halfway. For the fight against proliferation is a task that Europe in essence must 
still take on, not only through the enactment of legislation, such as the enactment of the 
repeatedly amended dual-use goods regulation, however important this piece of legisla-
tion may be. It is true that in practice progress has been made; one need only consider the 
now EU-wide IT-supported clearance system for importing and exporting goods (in 
Germany especially ATLAS export), which – unlike in the past – makes it possible to de-
termine when and where an item has left EU territory. The reason for this EU-wide sys-
tem is not primarily the fight against proliferation, however, but rather the facilitation of 
import and export clearance. In addition, attention is being paid to risk analysis, not only 
at national but also at the EU level, though not primarily – if at all – from the point of 
view of preventing proliferation, but rather from the point of view of the war against ter-
ror (security risk analysis). However proliferation and terrorism are fundamentally differ-
ent with regard to they are justified or how they manifest themselves.  
The cooperation among European customs administrations, which works outstand-
ingly well in other areas such as fighting drug trafficking, must be improved even more in 
the area of combating proliferation. In the past – apart from the US – only the Nether-
lands and the UK were interested in exchanging information. However, other countries 
such as France and Italy are also highly industrialized countries which pose a risk in terms 
of proliferation.  
At a European level an office – comparable to OLAF52 – must be established to gather 
information regarding “proliferation” in Europe (if not worldwide), to evaluate it and 
 
 
50   End-use inspections as they are intended – in other words checking sites in the destination country – are 
rejected by the German government, responded Cornelia Pieper, Minister of State in the FO, during 
Question Time in the Bundestag on December 14, 2011 – plenary proceedings 17/148, 17737. The parlia-
mentary party Alliance ‘90/The Greens is calling for such end-use inspections – resolution of parliamen-
tary party Alliance '90/The Greens of February 28, 2012 www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/beschluesse/ 
dokbin/404/404476.ruestungsexporte.pdf.  
51   For details see Ricke 2011: 316ff.  
52  OLAF – Office Europeen de Lutte Anti-Fraude – European Anti-fraud Office. 
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then to coordinate the work of the various authorities in the EU Member States in the 
fight against proliferation (“Office for Combating Proliferation”). The customs admin-
istrations of the EU Member States should provide the necessary personnel because it is 
the task of customs administrations to control the import and export of goods. Prevention 
and not repression must absolutely be at the forefront, because once it has come to crimi-
nal unauthorized export, damage has occurred that cannot be made good through even 
the most severe punishment. Therefore the fight against proliferation cannot be an – ad-
ditional – task for Europol.  
Assessment of the implementation 
As regards the implementation of these proposals, one can only be skeptical. Currently 
there is no evidence that the most important requirement for an effective fight against 
proliferation – the creation of a central European authority – will be considered by the 
Commission or by the European Parliament. At a national level, this requirement has 
recently been formulated by Alliance ‘90/The Greens in their party resolution of February 
28, 2012.53 The demand for control at the EU level includes also, and especially, legal ex-
ports. This is because proliferation occurs not only through illegal exports, but also to a 
not inconsiderable degree through legal exports or exports in the gray area. The focus 
here should not be on the area of weapons of mass destruction, but on the export of con-
ventional weapons of war instead.  
 
 
53   Alliance ‘90/The Greens, party decision of February 28, 2012 – arms export control – securing peace and 
protecting human rights – a new arms export law, 10 – www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/beschluesse/ 
dokbin/ 404/404476.ruestungsexporte.pdf (November 28, 2012). 
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List of Abbreviations  
AA Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany or German Foreign 
Office (Auswärtiges Amt) 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
AG German Municipal Court (Amtsgericht) 
AL Export control list or export list (Ausfuhrliste) 
ATLAS Ausfuhr Electronic customs administration system (as of 2006) 
AWG Foreign Trade and Payments Act (AWG) 
AWV Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung)  
BAFA Until December 31, 2000, Federal Office of Export (Bundesausfuhramt, 
BAFA); subsequently the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control 
(Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle) 
BAW Federal Office for Commercial Economics (Bundesamt für (gewerbliche) 
Wirtschaft) 
BGH Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgrichtshof) 
BGBl.  Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt) 
BMF Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen)  
BMFT Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung) 
BMWi Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Technologie)  
BND Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) 
BR-Drs. German Bundesrat document (Bundesratsdrucksache) 
BT-Drs.  Bundestag document part I or part II 
BVD Binnenlands Veiligheidsdienst – the Domestic Intelligence Service  
in the Netherlands until 2002  
BVerfG Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
BVerwG Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) 
CHASNUPP Chasma Nuclear Power Plant 
CWO Civil Works Organisation  
DCC Defence Committee of the Cabinet 
DV Data Processing (Datenverarbeitung) 
EC European Community 
ERL Engineering Research Laboratories (later: KRL) 
EU European Union 
FDO Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratorium Technische Onderzoeken 
B.V.  
GfK Gesellschaft für Kernforschung mbH 
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GSI Gesellschaft für Schwerionenforschung 
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IBS IBS-Industrieberatungs-Service (company of Peter Finke) 
KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant 
KfK Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe 
KOBRA Kontrolle bei der Ausfuhr (IT system of Federal Customs Administration 
from 1991 to 2006)  
KRL Khan Research Laboratories 
KWKG War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz) 
KWL War Weapons List (appendix to the War Weapons Control Act – KWKG)  
LEU Low Enriched Uranium 
MWB Metallwerke Buchs 
NTG Neue Technologien GmbH & Co KG (company of Rudolf Ortmayer) 
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Agency 
PARR Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor 
PINSTECH Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Sciences and Technology 
PTB Physikalisch-Technische Beratung 
RBU Reaktor-Brennelement-Union 
SGN Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles 
DA public prosecutor/district attorney 
StGB German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) 
StPO German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) 
UN United Nations  
UNC Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland N.V. 
URENCO Uranium Enrichment Company 
UWG Act Against Unfair Competition 
VG Administrative court (Verwaltungsgericht) 
VGH Higher Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) 
UN United Nations 
ZFA Customs Investigation Office (Zollfahndungsamt) 
ZFdG Customs Investigation Service Act (Zollfahndungsdienstgesetz) 
ZfZ Zeitschrift für Zölle und Verbrauchsteuern 
ZKA Customs Criminological Office (Zollkriminalamt, as of 1992) –  
Headquarters of the Custom Investigation Service 
